Is Armenia backtracking on unblocking regional transport routes?
Author: Farid Guliyev
August 26, 2022
By proposing to install border checkpoints Armenia is trying to forestall the realization of the Zangezur Corridor.
On Aug. 18, 2022, the announcement by Armenian National Security Service of a plan to open checkpoints along the inter-state border with Azerbaijan caught everyone by surprise. According to Interfax, the draft proposal stipulates that “three checkpoints — Sotk-Kalbajar [in the Gegharkunik region of northeastern Armenia], Yeraskh-Sadarak [in the Ararat region of southwestern Armenia, on the border with Nakhchivan] and Karahunj-Eyvazli [in the Syunik region of southeastern Armenia] — will be open for vehicles.” [Note: “Syunik” is known for Azerbaijanis by its historic name of “Zangezur”]. This proposal seems to be part of the so-called “simplified” border control regime (announced on June 9, 2022).
The draft bill — which is yet to be approved by the government — has been put forward by the Pashinyan government to fulfil an obligation under Article 9 of the Trilateral Statement signed by leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on November 10, 2020. Under the ceasefire agreement, both Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to unblock regional transport routes:
Article 9. All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections. (Trilateral Statement, Nov. 10, 2020)
Opening of transport routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan promises to generate economic benefits for both countries and to boost regional trade (Dreyfus and Hugot 2021). However, the current plan put forward by Armenia deviates from a more liberal-trade paradigm that seemed to have inspired the trilateral statement in the following key ways. First, while the Trilateral Statement specifically mentions a link between mainland Azerbaijan and its western exclave of Nakhchivan, the draft proposal makes no mention of any checkpoints at the Meghri/Agarak area on the border with Ordubad in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan AR. Second, despite the fact that the Trilateral Statement mandates “unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo”, according to the current Armenian draft Armenian border controls will apply. Third, the proposed checkpoints appear to be for vehicles only, and it is unclear whether these roads will be open for individuals to cross the border at the designated border points.
This distorted and downsized plan advanced by official Yerevan not only contradicts the word and spirit of the Trilateral Statement, but it also stands in stark contrast with a more ambitious vision espoused by Azerbaijani leadership. As a winning side in the 44-Day War of 2020, Azerbaijan has pursued the goal of obtaining a corridor — understood by Azerbaijani political establishment as the designated overland route and railway to enable the unimpeded flow of cargo, vehicles and people — that would link mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave and further on with Türkiye’s eastern province of Kars. Zangezur has both logistic and symbolic value for Azerbaijan, and Baku views Zangezur as part of its historical Ecumene (AzTV, Dec. 31, 2021; Niftaliyev, “How Azerbaijan Lost Zangezur”, 2021).
Armenia’s goal, on the other hand, has been to prevent this corridor from being materialized. Apparently, Armenian elites perceive the transit corridor to be a geopolitical threat rather than an economic new opportunity (Konarzewska 2021). Although Pashinyan’s government initially embraced the opening of transit routes as an opportunity for Armenia to open up and break out of the regional blockade, the Armenian leader later rejected the idea that a transport link should have the status of a corridor (Azatutyun, August 24, 2021). In October, 2021, Pashinyan announced that Armenia is ready to build a railway link raising hopes that the Zangezur Corridor might be getting closer to realization (Huseynov, Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 19, 2021). Despite initial hopes, however, there has been little progress. In recent months, there has been a noticeable shift in Armenian prime minister’s discourse who took recourse to semantic interpretations in trying to suggest that Armenia’s obligation under Article 9 of the Trilateral Statement simply implies that Azerbaijani citizens would get the right to cross the border with Armenia (Астхик Бедевян, Azatutyun, Aug.18, 2022). At a government session held on August 4, 2022, Pashinyan voiced this narrow vision of a transit route again:
“Yes, we are ready today and every day to provide overland communication between the western districts of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. It is Azerbaijan that does not use the opportunities provided by us. We are saying even today: cross the Armenian border [through several border crossings] and go to Nakhichevan according to the legislation of the Republic of Armenia. Today we are ready for that”. (Arka.am, Aug. 4, 2022).
Azerbaijan, in its turn, has been putting pressure on Yerevan to move ahead with implementing Article 9, and if necessary with display of its military might. On August 4, Azerbaijani troops seized control of several strategic heights in the Lachin Corridor. While some experts suggested that the military operation “intended to push the Armenians to stick to their recent pledge to withdraw their soldiers from Nagorno-Karabakh in September” (Stratfor, Aug. 4, 2022), the capture of strategic heights also allows Baku to put pressure on Armenia to fulfill its pledges to provide Baku with the much-vaunted corridor. To prop up its geopolitical leverage, Baku completed — ahead of schedule— the construction of an alternative road to replace the existing Lachin Corridor.
As an Armenian expert pointed out be putting forward the “checkpoints” proposal, Armenia appears to seek to “to neutralize” Azerbaijan’s vision of Zangezur Corridor (Areg Kochinyan, Asbarez, Aug. 19, 2022). In its preventative action, Armenia is certainly supported by Iran which stands to lose from the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor and may be acting as “a spoiler”. On August 13, 2022, Iran moved to establish a consulate in Gafan and appointed a consul general. By deliberately omitting a border crossing in the Meghri/Agarak area on the border with Ordubad/Nakhchivan, Armenia is clearly trying to keep the corridor talk off the table thus taking a preventive step against the implementation of a possible corridor. In a broader view, Yerevan’s efforts — backed up by Tehran — to obstruct the opening of a key regional transit route by substituting it with “simplified” border checkpoints— does not bode well for regional infrastructure projects and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Farid Guliyev, PhD is an independent policy analyst. The views expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the author.
© AzStudies 2022 [Please don’t republish without the author’s permission].
